Reformed ISDS

The investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism has come under fire in the past few years. As a result of many controversial cases, civil society groups, international organisations, academics, lawyers and state officials have argued that the arbitration process has had a negative impact on public interest and is need of reform or should be scrapped altogether.

Therefore tweaked versions of the system have been proposed to avoid the most undesired “side effects” of standard ISDS rules. At least 45 countries and four regional blocs are revising or have recently revised their investment model agreements.

In 2012, South Africa, the government started to withdraw from its bilateral investment treaties and amended domestic legislation to make it compatible with BIT-like investor protections while incorporating exceptions where warranted by public interest considerations.

In 2014, Indonesia decided to terminate 67 bilateral investment treaties and has also been developing a new model BIT that supposedly reflects a more balanced approach between the country’s right to regulate and foreigner investor protection.

In 2015, the European Commission established a new ’Investment Court System’ to replace the current ISDS mechanism in its trade deals. The ICS has been incorporated in the EU deals with Canada (CETA) and Vietnam. It has also been proposed for the ongoing negotiations with Mexico, the Philippines and the US (TTIP). However many critics claim that this new system is largely window-dressing.

In December 2015, India released a revised model BIT which, for instance, requires investors to exhaust domestic remedies (Indian courts) before turning to international arbitration and leaves out “fair and equitable treatment” provisions.

In 2016, members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland) amended the SADC Finance and Investment Protocol that included ISDS provisions. The amendments eliminate the ISDS mechanism (only state-to-state arbitration remains) and narrow the scope of investors’ rights, including exclusion of “fair and equitable treatment”, limitations to “national treatment” to allow for local preferences, obligation for investors to follow host state domestic law and exception from investment rules for policies enacted to comply with international treaties.

In South America, experts from the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) have been developing an investment settlement centre, as an alternative to the World Bank’s ICSID.

In 2017 states from around the world began to debate at UNCITRAL (United Nations Commission on International Trade Law) about the possible reform of the ISDS system in a way that would address legitimacy concerns and rebalance the system. As part of these discussions, the EU proposed the creation of a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC), which was slammed by civil society groups, as the MIC would “enshrine, expand, and entrench the current system of corporate privilege in future trade deals.”

Photo: Attac / CC BY-SA 2.0

March 2021

Mondaq | 12-Sep-2019
The traditional mechanism of investment arbitration between the investor and the host State has been under attack for some time now from a range of actors and for a variety of reasons.
Climate Home News | 24-Jul-2019
Campaigners are urging reform of an obscure system that allows coal, oil and gas companies to sue governments if climate policies hit their profits.
Reuters | 29-May-2019
Multinational companies will increasingly file massive cases against host countries when climate change policies affect their profits, Nobel Prize-winning economist Joseph Stiglitz said.
Barbados Today | 6-May-2019
Caribbean States and investors are not only participating, but being harmed by the ills and abuses of the current system of ISDS.
Kluwer Arbitration Blog | 2-May-2019
The 37th session in New York was devoted to addressing and identifying some additional concerns and creating a workplan for carrying out phase three of the mandate—developing possible ISDS reform options.
EU Observer | 30-Apr-2019
But legality should not be our main concern here. There are much better approaches to international investment and we should be considering them.
IISD | 26-Apr-2019
Si el régimen pretende apoyar el desarrollo, y superar la crisis de legitimidad que enfrenta el régimen internacional de inversiones, se requiere algo más que una reforma procesal de la ISDS.
IISD | 26-Apr-2019
Si l’on souhaite que le régime international des investissements soutienne plus efficacement le développement, et surmonte la crise de légitimité à laquelle il fait face, il faudra plus que de simples réformes procédurales du RDIE
IISD | 26-Apr-2019
If the investment regime is to be made supportive of development and overcome its legitimacy crisis confronting, something more is required than procedural reforms to ISDS.
IISD | 12-Apr-2019
The proposed amendments signal an effort to improve the procedural rules governing ICSID arbitration, but fail to appropriately address many concerns expressed and fall short of promoting meaningful reform of investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS).