One of the most notable proposals identifies an investor’s initiation of arbitration as implied consent to a tribunal’s jurisdiction over counterclaims.
During the week of 22 September 2025, States once again met in Vienna under Working Group III of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) to deliberate reforms to investor–State dispute settlement.
This paper summarizes the discussions within the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law Working Group III on the reform of investor-state dispute settlement regarding the two draft provisions on damages.
A documentary film offers a powerful illustration of the ways in which ISDS can impact third parties, exacerbate inequalities, and reinforce power imbalances.
Although a universal and uniform framework regulating arbitrators’ conduct is useful, its impact may be limited due to limited implementation prospects and the absence of punitive measures.
The investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) system could be putting climate action at risk in emerging and developing economies as investors in fossil fuel projects angle for compensation, experts say.
To maintain the system, he proposes that business should shift away from ISDS in state-to state trade and investment agreements, and instead move to ISDS in contracts between individual investors and states.
Our frequent inability to answer even basic questions about the full universe is a salutary reminder that we know less than is ideal about investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS).
This article aims to explore the issue of double hatting in the field of arbitration in the context of recent developments in the field of international arbitration and the critique against it.
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL" or "Commission") Working Group III finalized provisions on the use of mediation in ISDS.